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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PEGGY BEZNER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No. 14119

-vsCONTINENTAL DRY CLEANERS,
INC., a Corporation, and
BERT HARRY,
Defendants and Appellants.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

In accordance with Rule 75(p)(l) and (2) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the appellants submit the following in reply to respondent's
brief on appeal.
POINT I
THE TRIAL OOURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO AWARD RESPONDENT
GREATER DAMAGES THAN IT AWARDED SINCE RESPONDENT FAILED TO
MEET HER BURDEN OF PROOF THAT SHE WAS ENTITLED TO A GREATER
AWARD.
In Point III of Respondent's Brief, respondent raises the
contention that trial court erred in allowing $3,719.00 to defendants
as reasonable rental for the equipment under the contract which was
attached to respondent's complaint as Exhibit A.
such award or finding.

The court made no

The judgment on the verdict (R. 31) merely

recites that respondent is entitled to damages on her claim for
rescission in the sum of $9,600 plus $1,070 interest.
An examination of respondent's amended complaint shows that
the prayer in respondent's complaint requested rescission of the
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-2contract between plaintiff and defendant being Exhibit A and
restitution of plaintiff to all sums paid under said contract
being approximately $12,000. The basis of the respondent's
first cause of action was that the execution of the contract
Exhibit A for the sale of In-And-Out Dry Cleaners to respondent
was a fraudulent representation by appellant. Respondent

_...

acknowledges that under Erisman v. Overman, 11 Utah 258, 358 P.2d 85
(1961) that appellants would be entitled to some consideration
for the use of the equipment during the time that respondent
was in possession.

In the Erisman case, the court denied

rescission where the plaintiff sat on her rights for a period
of approximately a year and recognized that plaintiff had a
legitimate claim under the contract for the benefit conferred on
the defendant.

In this case, since the respondent put a cause of

action in fraud, respondent had the burden of proving the fraud
and the damages which arose as a result of the fraud.

The contract

in question provided in Paragraph 2 (R. 144) for a $10,000 initial
payment in two payments with a balance of $30,000 being paid in
equal monthly installments over a ten-year period.

Respondent

paid the equal monthly installments for all but the last two
months of which she was in possession being a little over $300
per month. The general rule as to the burden of proof as to
damages is set forth in 22 Am. Jur. 2d., Damages, § 296, where
it is stated:
tT

As a rule, the burden of proof is upon the
plaintiff to show the fact and extent of the
injury and to show the amount and value of
his damages, whether the action is a breach
of contract or for tort."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-3In 37 Am. Jur. 2d., Fraud and Deceit, § 449, it is observed:
"The burden of proof of injury sustained
through reliance upon a false representation
rests upon the party who alleges fraud. He
must prove that he has suffered a loss or has
been prejudiced by the fraud to the extent
requisite to warrant the grant of the relief
which he seeks. Thus, it is incumbent upon
one seeking to rescind a contract for fraud
to prove whatever element of injury from the
fraud is requisite to the relief sought.
Damage or prejudice from fraud is not ordinarily
presumed. Hence, one seeking to recover damages
for fraud in a law action must prove that he has
suffered a loss directly from, and as a clear
and necessary consequence of, the fraud to an
extent so definite and ascertainable that an
award providing for the payment to him of a
sum properly compensating him for the fraud
practiced upon him, or granting him adequate
relief by way of recoupment or cross complaint,
may be made.
"The plaintiff must prove the extent of the
damages he contends resulted from the fraud;
and where he alleges that he sustained a loss
therefrom, he must prove the method by which""
he suffered the loss. To justify the application of either the Tbenefit of the bargainT
or the Tout of pocketT measure of damages,
the complainant must prove the actual value
of the property purchased, at the time of
purchase. Also, in order to have damages
measured by the benefit of the bargain, or
by the amount required to make a representation good, the party seeking damages for a
false representation concerning property sold
to, or received in exchange by,him, must
produce evidence of what the property would
have been worth if it had been as represented."
(Emphasis added.)
In Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952), this Court
stated with reference to prior Utah cases that "measure of damages
for fraud is a difference between value of property purchased and
the value it would have had if the representations were true."
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-4In Dilworth v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 386, 424 P.2d 136 (1967), the
court noted that "Utah follows the majority rule which is the
difference between the actual value of what he received and the
value thereof if it had been as represented."

In Lamb v. Bangart,

525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974), the same standard was reiterated by the
Court.

Therefore, it was respondent's burden to prove the measure

of the damages to which she was entitled on rescission.
Respondent had the burden of proving that the value of the
equipment which she possessed for approximately nine months
during which time she paid a sum of a little over $300 a month
was not equal to the benefit conferred but was less than the
money she had actually paid out during that time.

The record is

silent as to any evidence from the plaintiff that the possessory
value of the equipment held and used during the period in which
she was in occupancy was not equal to the sum paid during that
time especially considering that for two months of her occupancy,
she failed to make equipment payments.
The instant case is not unlike that recently decided by
the Court in Wagstaff v. Remco, 540 P.2d 931 (Utah 1975).

In

that case, this Court approved the trial court's action of
allowing a general contractor who had frustrated a subcontractor's
performance of a contract the amount of expenses reasonable and
necessary to complete the job.

In the instant case, the trial

court simply entered judgment for the respondent-plaintiff for
the amount of damages proved but where respondent-plaintiff did
not prove that the value of the possessory interest in the
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-5equipment possessed was less than the money paid during the time
of the possession there was no right to recover additional damages*
The burden of proving damages was on respondent and the evidence
supports the conclusion of the trial court that no greater damages
than those awarded was in fact proved by respondent;
POINT II
RESPONDENT'S CROSS APPEAL CONTENTION AS TO APPELLANTS
BREACH OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT WAS NOT PROPERLY PRESERVED FOR APPELLATE CONSIDERATION AND IS OTHERWISE
WITHOUT MERIT.
Rule 74(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs
cross appeals and provides that the party desiring to cross appeal
"shall file a statement of points on which he intends to rely on
such cross appeal" within the time provided by Rule 75(d) URCP.
Rule 75(d) URCP provides that a statement of points on cross appeal
shall be filed within ten days after service and filing of appellant's
designation. On the instant case, the designation of record on
appeal was filed on June 17, 1975. On June 23, 1975, respondent
filed a cross appeal and statement of points. No statement of
point was contained in the cross appeal relating to the refusal
of the trial court to submit the factual question of breach of the
lease Exhibit B (R. 146) to the jury (R. 4 ) . Thereafter, an amended
cross appeal was filed on June 26, 1975. The amended cross appeal
purported to incorporate as a statement on appeal the contention
raised in Point IV of respondent's brief.

The appellants contend

that since neither Rule 74(b) or 75(d) nor Rule 15 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure sanction amended cross appeals that no amended
cross appeal may be filed after the statement of points on an
original cross appeal has in fact been filed.

Rule 15(a) provides
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-6in part:

"Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave

of court or by written consent of the adverse party . . ." In
the instant case, consent of appellant was not obtained before
amendment nor was leave of court obtained.

Consequently, it is

submitted that the contention raised in Point IV of respondent's
brief has not properly been preserved on appeal.
The respondent contends in Point IV of her brief "that the
rescission of the contract for purchase of fraud warrants a rescission and cancellation of the lease in that they were interdependent."

(Respondent's Brief, p. 27). An examination of the

pleadings in the instant case reveal that in respondent's amended
complaint, second cause of action, she contended that appellants
breached their lease agreement (Exhibit B) (R. 166). In her
prayer, respondent asked for judgment against the defendants
for the sum of $300 for damages occasioned to the respondent
by reason of breach of the lease agreement (R. 141, 142). There
was no request made by respondent for rescission.

Consequently,

any claim for rescission is raised the first time on appeal. It
is well settled law in the State of Utah that a theory of recovery
not submitted to the trial court cannot be considered for the
first time on appeal.

General Appliance Corporation v. Haw, Inc.,

30 Utah 2d 238, 516 P.2d 346 (1973); Clegg v. Lee, 30 Utah 2d 242,
516 P.2d 348 (1973).

Consequently, any contention of the res-

pondent's that the lease Exhibit B was interdependent with the
rescission cause of action relating to Exhibit A is not properly
before the court.
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-7Further, it should be noted that in the final contention
in Point IV, respondent requests the court reverse the lower
court and enter judgment in favor of respondent in the sum of
$350.

If respondent's amended cross appeal is properly before

the court it is limited by the issue framed in Paragraph 3 that
the trial court erred in "refusing to submit" the issue to the
jury.

Consequently, the request for relief in Point IV of

respondent's brief is outside the scope of the preserved issue
on appeal. Further, it is worth noting on this point that the
respondent's brief on Page 26 asks for judgment in the sum of
$350 whereas on Page 22 of respondent's brief, respondent
indicates that the evidence from respondent indicated that the
damages were only $330.

Further, respondent's amended complaint

asked for only $300 in damages and respondent's requested instruction
No. 27 (R. 72) asks for damages in the sum of $297.50. It is apparent
from this jumbled approach to this issue that respondent has not
cautiously and analytically treated the issue and it is without
merit.
The trial court refused to submit the issue of breach of
lease Exhibit B (R. 146) because the trial court concluded there
was no factual conflict in need of jury resolution.

An examination

of Exhibit B (R. 146) discloses that in the 5th paragraph, respondent
agreed to the following circumstances:
"The said parties of the second part accept this
Lease and the premises described therein in the
condition and state of repair they are now in,
and agree to occupy the same in a lawful manner
and will keep the water pipes and their connections,
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-8sewage pipes and their connections, upon
said premises, at all times, in good condition
and state of repair . . . ." (Emphasis added).
In the 6th paragraph, respondent agreed to the following additional
terms:
"That the party of the first part shall not be
liable for any damage occasioned by failure
to keep said premises in repair and shall not
be liable for any damage done or occasioned
by or from plumbing, gas, water, steam or
other pipes or sewage, or the bursting,
leaking, or running of any washstand, tank,
water closet or waste pipe in above, upon,
or about said building or premises, nor from
damage occasioned by water arising from acts
or neglect or co-tenants or other occupants
of the same building." (Emphasis added).
Respondent now contends that since the 13th paragraph of the contract
required appellant to keep the premises and exterior of the leased
building in good condition and state of repair that there was a
failure to comply with the terms of the lease. The factual evidence
before the trial court failed to show that the premises were in any
different condition as to state of repair on the day of the execution
of Exhibit B than the day of the alleged water damage to the premises.
Further, there is no evidence of record whatsoever to support a
contention that the water damage sustained by respondent was the
result of any defect in the exterior portion of the premises or
building.

The evidence at the time of trial clearly indicated

that any damage that may have been caused was the result of a
drain pipe backing up, freezing and water spilling over into the
area damaged.

(T. 363, 381, 360, 205-207, 226). Further, Paragraph

six of the lease expressly excludes the appellants from liability
for damage occasioned by water.

Thus, it is clearly apparent that
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-9Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Exhibit B as interpreted by the trial court
precluded submissions of the issue to the jury as there was no
factual basis left in dispute that warranted jury consideration.
Point IV of respondent's brief therefore is unmeritorious and respondent
should take nothing by way of cross appeal.
CONCLUSION
It is apparent from an examination of the respondent's claims
on cross appeal that respondent's position is one of complaining
about her own failure to submit credible evidence sufficient to
sustain her contentions. The trial court carefully considered
the issues raised by the matters before this Court in respondent's
cross appeal and found them unmeritorious. Respondent's cross
appeal should afford respondent no relief and the case should be
reversed on the basis of the contentions set forth in appellant's
brief and either dismissed or a new trial awarded.
Respectfully submitted,

JOHN B. ANDERSON
610 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorney for Appellants
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